The war on the European continent has resulted in a new effort to strengthen the European Union’s defence capabilities. However, beyond military support for Ukraine, is there a shared EU vision for its future security and defence policy?
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The European Union is above all a political and economic union. Its defence dependence on NATO and the United States is therefore well known and shared. However, the war in Europe’s backyard has set alarm bells ringing in Brussels and in European capitals. European leaders finally agreed that a reassessment of Europe’s defence and security capabilities would allow the bloc to act alone if necessary.
The European Zeitenwende
The war marked a Zeitenwende, a turn of the times, in the now famous words of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the Bundestag.
It signalled the crucial shift in the EU defence policies, first of all, with the increase in defence budgets in most EU countries. While NATO required its members to spend two per cent of their GDP on defence in the wake of the war in Ukraine, many EU capitals have pledged to spend even more.
The most striking example of this mentality shift, brought about by the war in Ukraine is Germany, which has added €100 billion to its defence expenditure over the next four years. Other countries are also planning to do so, such as France, which aims to put more than €400 billion euros between 2024 and 2030, an increase of €295 billion over the previous period; the Netherlands, which has announced a commitment of more than €19 billion annually by between now and 2024; and Poland, which is set to ramp up its defence budget to 4 per cent of its GDP in 2023, up from 2,4 per cent in 2022. Even traditionally neutral countries, such as Austria, have increased their military budgets – Vienna has pledged to bring its defence budget to 1.5 per cent of GDP, with €16 billion over the next four years. Several countries are also looking at improving some form of military service.
This development is actually part of a longer-term trend, dating back at least to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Already in 2021, total European defence funding exceeded €200 billion for the first time, according to a report by the European Defence Agency.
Still, the Ukraine war has accelerated this trend: according to a McKinsey assessment, European NATO countries will increase their funding by 53-65 per cent by 2026 compared to a base case of 14 per cent if the war did not occur.
Quite obviously, this move goes hand in hand with the support provided to Ukraine, as explains Marie Brethous, analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, an EU agency analysing foreign, security and defense policy issues.
Marie Brethous, Analyst at European Union Institute for Security Studies: The EU emerged as an actor
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“Throughout these last two months and ever since the brutal attack of Russia in Ukraine and the beginning of the war, we have seen that the EU and all its member states have really stepped up and committed to supporting Ukraine, no less by sending weapons and lethal weapons, even to an active war zone on the European soil, which is really a first. And it was certainly not expected or, I guess was very much welcomed by the international security community, because the EU has really been able to step up as an actor in these last months, and especially also provide substantial support to Ukraine.”
First time ever
However, beyond support for Ukraine and the necessary engagement with NATO, is there a clear vision for an EU-wide defence policy or strategy? Are EU member states able to jointly consider a balanced allocation to defence and security, based on shared priorities, in order to avoid fragmentation and gain scale?
Starting with equipment. In the Union, while the procurement of military equipment is still primarily conducted on a national basis, recent EU-wide initiatives seem to pave the way for increased cross-border cooperation.
The first common instrument to be created and used by the EU, the European Peace Facility, is intended to finance, with European funds, military assistance worldwide. Launched in 2021, the war in Ukraine given it a massive boost: previously used to finance training missions in countries such as Mali, Somalia, and Niger, the EPF money is now used to buy weapons for a country at war, in that it reimburses member states for their costs of supplying Ukraine. For Kyiv, the EU has spent €3.6 billion, more than half of the entire EPF budget until 2027.
At the moment, the EPF sits outside of the formal EU budget. However, in the long term this will concretise into a structural commitment in the bloc’s budget, says Marie Brethous.
Marie Brethous, Analyst at European Union Institute for Security Studies: More budget for a European defence
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“Currently the efforts of the EU and the European Peace Facility are geared towards the supporting of Ukraine. But, that being said, I think that the European Union has really seen that for the next round of the Multiannual Financial Framework [the EU’s long term budget], it will likely contribute with more efforts and also more budget to the defence policy, which in the last year has been going down comparatively. So, I think that we have started a new sort of ‘page’ in terms of defence budgets to come.”
Other steps also seem to suggest a new joint vision of how EU member states should act in this field. The launch of the European Defence Fund, with a budget of almost €8 billion for the period 2021 to 2027, was a breakthrough: for the first time the Union’s budget was allocated to defence spending. Another programme, is helping the 27 member states to team up on defence expenditure: the European defence industry Reinforcement through the common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) worth €500 million, which is also paving the way for a future European Defence Investment Programme.
Push forwards and pushbacks
However, in the future, the main challenge for defence and security policy is likely to be maintaining cohesion and ensuring the unity of the EU and its member states. Not least because some EU countries, especially in the East, prefer to rely on NATO for their security, notes Andrius Kubilius, former Lithuanian prime minister and now a member of the European Parliament.
Andrius Kubilius, Member of the European Parliament – EPP, Lithuania: What do we want to achieve?
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“All the EU member states, with very small exceptions, are members of NATO. And then, when we start talking about European defence capabilities, it sounds like this is outside NATO, and that creates some kind of confusion. What do we want to do? That’s why, on the European side, we need in some way to come to more clear understanding of what we want to achieve. Because when somebody is speaking about a European army -or something similar- especially in our countries, in the Baltic states, which are very much expecting that NATO is our core institution for our security, we are very much afraid of some kind of fragmentation and to weaken NATO”.
This coordination between these EU defence and security initiatives and NATO’s action is undoubtedly a key issue for the future.
Moreover, several aspects related to multinational cooperation within the EU may slow down common defence planning, as analyst Dick Zandee of Clingendael suggests: differences in language and culture, historical and geographical factors, and national industrial interests.
Therefore, despite the obvious advantages of EU-level coordination in terms of scale and sectoral budget allocation, many EU governments continue to plan their military purchases at national level. As stated in the 2022 report of the European Defence Agency, “member states generally consider cooperation only when it coincides with national plans, benefits national industry, or consolidates a strategic partnership.”
What seems to be lacking is a common and shared goal among EU countries.
Andrius Kubilius, Member of the European Parliament – EPP, Lithuania – What is the EU’s strategic goal?
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“If we are talking about the European defence system, what are we talking about? Because resources needed are very huge and member states are not able to have separate resources for EU military capabilities and for NATO military capabilities. So, at the NATO level, I do not see any problems with this cross-border cooperation. Of course, there are always issues where we need to improve ourselves, but I do not see any major problem. If we are talking about EU member states cooperation, again, that is a question: so what is, what is our strategic goal? And what do we want to achieve?”
So there is a will – but the way is less clear. Brussels will have to work hard to come up with solutions that will break down resistance and scepticism in the future.



